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Reporting Humanitarian Narratives  – are we missing out on the politics? 
 
Introduction  
Western audiences have become accustomed to the way the media report crises in the 
developing world. The framing of the coverage frequently focuses upon the 
humanitarian dimension of the crisis, often to the exclusion of other aspects. This 
chapter will discuss how the nature of this coverage has evolved and the extent to 
which the trope of humanitarian reporting is closely connected with how many NGOs 
seek to interpret and portray faraway suffering. It will also highlight the notable 
contrast with the manner in which crises in developed nations are interpreted; where 
there is a more rounded and nuanced understanding of the origins and effects of the 
problem. The chapter will further investigate how the focus of attention upon the 
humanitarian dimension in the reporting can mean that there is diminished evidence 
of a political understanding of the nature of such crises in faraway places.  
There is a well-understood argument that faraway crises are constructed by media 
coverage, because without the media, in most cases there would be no awareness or 
knowledge of such events (Benthall, 2010). Indeed many serious crises are hidden 
from view and the wider world is barely aware they exist (Humanitarian Practice 
Network, 2002) (Hawkins, 2008) (Sen Arijit, 2011). Yet even when there is reporting, 
the nature of the coverage is not necessarily sufficiently well informed to give 
audiences an adequate picture. According to Ian Smillie what we experience is 
“random, fickle and incomplete” … because reporting and understanding faraway 
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places and in particular “news about the developing world is authorless, anchorless 
and impossible to understand or follow” (Smillie, The Alms Bazaar, 1995). 
 
All too often the reporting of humanitarian crises in the developing world and 
particularly in Africa follows a familiar narrative. Its emphasis is upon distant 
suffering of helpless civilians who are usually awaiting some kind of salvation from 
external forces. This has been well examined, originally by (Boltanski, 1999) in 
Distant Suffering and more recently by Chouliaraki in The Spectatorship of Suffering 
(Chouliaraki L. , 2006). It is apparent that the tone and focus of this coverage of 
humanitarian crises from the developing world is very often disconnected from wider 
explanations and understanding. 
 
 Unlike the coverage of crises in more developed regions, the suffering is often 
highlighted in exclusion from and not linked to causes, explanations, and even 
possible solutions. Invariably this simplification and intense focus upon suffering – 
usually in the form of shocking visual images – leaves out so much else. In particular 
there is no emphasis upon political causes underlying the problem or political 
processes as a means to solve the issues (Calhoun, 2016). Or at best these are dealt 
with in a superficial and stereotypical manner, or sometimes misconceived and 
inaccurately described. The pattern of this kind of reporting cannot be viewed in 
isolation as only a failing of the media. Sometimes it is in the particular interests of 
the political players both the donors and those in the country where the crisis is 
situated to minimize the role of politics. This framing is also part of a narrative 
conveyed by NGOs involved in fundraising for humanitarian crises who may wish to 
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downplay contradictory and complicated factors at the expense of a simplified story 
of suffering that requires urgent outside assistance. 
 
Origins of Humanitarian Reporting 
The birth of what has become known as “humanitarian reporting” in the modern era 
began with the international coverage of the Biafran war in the 1960s. The 
consequence of the fighting between the Igbo secessionists and the Nigerian state was 
widespread starvation and suffering amongst the civilian Igbo population. During the 
course of that conflict a new form of crisis reporting was born and this eventually 
became the dominant influence on the way that western media came to interpret 
disasters in the developing world for the decades that followed. Shocking visual 
images of civilian suffering, including starving children, became headline news on 
mainstream international television output and very unusually even in the tabloid 
press. It was a confluence of several factors which led to this new form of coverage; 
developments in technology which made the mass media use of such images a daily 
possibility, a developing awareness amongst NGOs of the potency of such images, a 
highly media literate group of advisers who surrounded the rebel forces and 
journalists who were interested in a new way of reporting which gained them 
extraordinary visibility (Harrison & Palmer, 1986). 
 
Colonel Ojukwo leader of the rebel Biafrans had used the services of a PR agency 
Markpress, based in Geneva to promote his cause. He also attracted some high profile 
and media literate supporters, such as Frederick Forsyth (the future thriller writer), 
who disappeared from his post as a BBC reporter covering the war in order to become 
a cheerleader for the Biafran cause. A number of key aid agency workers – in 
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particular those working for the Irish based Catholic relief mission- became 
passionate advocates for the suffering Biafran civilians (Harrison & Palmer, 1986). 
And other relief workers such as Bernard Kouchner (the future French foreign 
minister) were so moved by the suffering that they founded the relief agency 
Medicines sans Frontiers in response to their desire to offer solidarity with the Biafran 
cause. The shocking images of Biafran children starving became a cause célèbre for 
radical protest in western capitals. And for years to come the very word “Biafran” was 
associated with these images of extreme starvation. 
 
This support for the Igbo cause mediated through the use of shocking images of 
hunger and suffering translated into a huge flow of aid and assistance provided by 
independent NGOs prepared to challenge the Nigerian blockade. There were dramatic 
night time flights into Biafra conveying food and medical aid (and it eventually 
transpired, arms and ammunition were also being smuggled aboard). More cynically 
the rebel regime charged “landing fees” and an unrealistic exchange rate which 
became its prime source of foreign currency and was in turn used for purchasing arms. 
(Barrow & Jenkins, 2001) This “back story” to the Biafran crisis only emerged much 
later and became a complicated twist to the dominant narrative conveyed by the 
terrible images. Yet it was an important and political context because it eventually 
emerged that the use of the pictures of hungry children had unintentionally enabled 
the rebels, whose cause was ultimately a hopeless one, to continue fighting for months 
if not years longer than they would otherwise have been able, inevitably leading to far 
more suffering and death. In this way the aid, which was raised internationally and 
donated to Biafra as a result of the propaganda effort, could be viewed as having done 
“more harm than good.” The over riding imperative was to end the suffering of 
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starving civilians whose plight was plastered across popular media – print and 
television – rather than a more nuanced discourse able to understand the complicated 
political situation, and the complex assessments needed to resolve the crisis. One of 
the journalists who had covered the story, Colin Legum, later commented that “Your 
head was telling you one thing but your heart was telling you something very 
different.” (BBC, 1995) 
 
Famine in Ethiopia 
Some years after Biafra there was another world wide transmission of a report of 
African suffering when the 1984 story of the Ethiopian famine broke on BBC 
Television (Harrison & Palmer, 1986). The reporter Michael Buerk (and the Visnews 
cameraman Mo Amin) travelled to Tigray in northern Ethiopia and broadcast a news 
report containing harrowing pictures of widespread starvation which was then 
transmitted on over 400 stations worldwide and won countless awards. Buerk 
memorably used the phrase “biblical famine” to describe the grim scenes he 
witnessed there (Buerk, 2004). Once again this was a complicated and unpleasant 
story of competing military and political actors who were largely indifferent to 
civilian suffering (Rieff, 2002; Buerk, 2004). But this uncomfortable dimension to the 
suffering was largely absent from the ensuing media coverage. Despite the work of 
Amartya Sen and others on the significant social and political origins of famine, this 
barely resonated in the way the story was portrayed, as it reverberated around the 
world including mainstream tabloid outlets (Sen A. , 1981; de Waal, 1997). Instead 
the international attention, on a scale that was without precedent with its 
accompanying powerful images focused upon what was apparently a “natural disaster.” 
A singular narrative depicted an unfortunate population starving due to lack of annual 
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rains. The accompanying celebrity involvement and in particular the birth of 
“compassion through rock music” under the aegis of Band Aid and Live Aid 
reinforced this simple and uncomplicated coverage. (Harrison & Palmer, 1986) 
 
Ethiopia in 1984/5 thereby assumed the narrative of a story of “pure humanitarian 
suffering” which required straightforward humanitarian assistance. It was even 
characterized as “a golden age of humanitarianism” which referred to the apparent 
nature of the suffering and the world wide compassionate response (Robinson, 2002). 
This became the dominant frame both at the time and in popular memory, largely 
through the collective experience of Live Aid and the associated fund raising. Yet 
there is clear evidence that even as the famine unfolded there was a wider political 
dimension that was being conveniently side lined, both internally in the causes of the 
famine and externally in the international response. 
 
The original report of the famine, which became such a momentous news 
sensation was treated as a sudden event, yet self-evidently famine is a long and slow 
process. This sense of a breaking news story is what propelled the issue into the 
international headlines. However it is clear that Western governments had been aware 
of the famine for many months, so it is rather strange that the day after the BBC 
report there was an emergency statement to the UK Parliament reacting to the 
revelations in the news and promising emergency relief. For the diplomats, Foreign 
Office officials and Ministers this was not breaking news. Yet they reacted as if the 
images were a shocking revelation of an unknown and humanitarian crisis, a natural 
disaster.  The internal group within the UK government set up to monitor the public 
response was called the “Ethiopian Drought Group” (Franks, 2013). Yet in fact the 
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causes of the famine were well beyond lack of rains, but the title ignored the social 
and political origins of the crisis.  
 
Paradoxically it could be argued that at the time it was specifically because there were 
wider political reasons that the international response was largely limited to dealing 
with what was framed as a non-political humanitarian crisis. The dominant cold war 
ideology still infused much of western foreign policy. As Ethiopia was firmly within 
the Soviet sphere, this meant that long term engagement in development was out of 
the question for Western countries. They were prepared to send emergency aid, but 
even in doing this they were determined to use evidence of the donations as a means 
of criticizing the “other” side. Both the US President Reagan and in the UK Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher made much of the contrast between the generosity of the 
Western nations providing humanitarian relief, compared with the Eastern bloc that 
were only interested in supplying arms (Franks, 2013). Western aid was given a high 
media profile. For example, there was a determined priority encouraging Royal Air 
Force air drops of food which made for great television pictures, even though aid 
workers criticized this for being expensive and inefficient way of providing relief. 
The overriding message was that this was a natural disaster and the aid kindly 
supplied by generous Western donors would feed the suffering and solve the problem.  
 
It is a further paradox that the same attitude toward the crisis was apparent from 
within the Ethiopian regime, despite their very different ideological alignment. The 
problem was only ever described as a drought (Article 19, 1990). For obvious reasons 
there was no willingness to acknowledge the political background to the famine in 
Tigray and Eritrea. The war against the secessionists despite being on a huge scale 
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was conducted largely in secret from both the national and international media. For 
example one of the medical aid workers described how during that period she once 
stumbled across a ward full of wounded Ethiopian soldiers who were usually kept out 
of sight of foreigners (Bertschinger, 2005, p. 126). Similarly the deliberate policies 
against the civilians in those areas were not being acknowledged and this included the 
brutal villagization or resettlement policy that caused many thousands of deaths 
(Brauman, 1988). In fact some assessments claim that it was as deadly as the famine 
itself (Clay,1989). So there was a convenient labelling of the crisis as solely 
attributable to lack of rainfall, rather than the vanishing entitlements of a vulnerable 
population attributable to political and military decisions (Giorgis, 1989). Crucially 
this again played into the convenient and simple narrative of humanitarian suffering 
devoid of political causes that could therefore be relieved by the transfer of aid.  
 
The preference of the Ethiopian regime – as in many other similar crises from 
Myanmar to Somalia – was that they distrusted international NGOs and therefore 
wanted where possible, to keep the delivery of aid within their own ambit. This was 
not just for straightforward political reasons of control but also because aid could then 
sometimes be diverted elsewhere - something that Polman (2011) argues inevitably 
takes place to a greater or lesser extent, against a background of conflict. It was 
particularly significant in this crisis because the Ethiopian government was seeking to 
use the aid for its forced resettlement program of moving the population away from 
the northern areas affected by the famine (Clay & Holcomb, 1986). This became 
highly controversial and when Medecins Sans Frontiers (MSF) spoke out publicly 
against this policy and the way that international aid was being used to support it, the 
doctors were subsequently expelled from the country (Brauman, 1988). Other 
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agencies including the UN were accused of being complicit by not preventing this use 
of aid to fulfil such a policy. In some cases the Ethiopian government insisted on 
making the supply of food to hungry children contingent upon their parents’ 
agreement to being resettled.  
 
Medicins Sans Frontiers (MSF) argued that NGOs and the UN needed to engage with 
the political realities of relief rather than allowing the Ethiopian government to 
manipulate them. But by trying to keep the agenda to a simple one of looking after the 
needy and not enquiring further or avoiding confrontation, many of the agencies and 
of course the government of Mengistu were limiting the problem to a pure 
humanitarian crisis, with potentially devastating consequences for the population of 
the affected areas. The Article 19 report Starving in Silence highlighted this dilemma 
and concluded that “it is essential that the coverage is politically informed. Over-
hyped naively “humanitarian” reporting can be as bad as no reporting at all.” The 
report went on to say “the Band Aid factor distracts attention from the need to address 
the political causes underlying the famines in Ethiopia” (Article 19, 1990). 
 
Rwanda and its consequences 
 
A further and very prominent example of how a story of humanitarian suffering 
became disconnected from a wider political context occurred in the aftermath of the 
Rwandan genocide, when millions of refugees fled across the border to Eastern 
Congo in 1994. There was a well-reported crisis in the camps dealing with this huge 
influx of refugees, which was linked to a major aid appeal to Western nations. 
Hundreds of NGOs descended upon the area to minister to those who had arrived in 
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the camps. Yet it was only some time later that it emerged that many of those 
receiving succor were in fact from the Interahamwe, the Hutu genocidaires and their 
families who had left Rwanda when they feared that they might be sought out by the 
invading RPF armies.  David Rieff makes the following comparison “It is as if two 
hundred thousand SS soldiers had taken their families out of Nazi Europe as it fell to 
the Allies, to somewhere they could hope to be sheltered from retribution, by 
sympathetic NGOs” (Rieff, 2002, p. 53). 
 
The fault for this misinterpretation and misunderstanding of the refugee crisis in and 
around Goma in 1994 lay both with the NGOs and with the media (Terry, 2002). The 
aid agencies that arrived in unprecedented numbers were caught up with the 
immediate challenge of caring for a huge volume of refugees. There was plenty of 
competitive posturing in this as it was also a valuable fundraising opportunity because 
of the focus of attention (Dowden, 2004). Yet they failed to ask the right questions of 
who was being helped. Meanwhile the media too were failing to understand and to 
probe into what was going on. It is well known that journalists neglected the Rwandan 
genocide, partly because it coincided with a major story in South Africa; the 
inauguration of Nelson Mandela as President so in the aftermath of the genocide few 
journalists had sufficient understanding of what was really happening. George 
Alagiah of the BBC for example admits that for a week he (along with many others) 
failed to comprehend and properly report the story of the refugee crisis (Alagiah, 
2001, p. 120) 
 
With this wholesale misinterpretation of major stories of crises, we are left to question 
if delving into the complexities of such events matters less when the crises occur in 
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Africa. If we compare coverage of Africa to coverage of commensurate crises in 
Europe, we find that media reporting differs greatly. The reporting of difficult 
confrontations in other parts of the world such as the long drawn out Northern Irish 
crisis or the fighting in the Balkans in the 1990s were subject to different standards of 
reporting (Myers, 1996). The humanitarian suffering in the Balkans in the 1990s was 
never encapsulated solely as a story of hopeless victims engaged in an inexplicable 
suffering. There was a repeated explanation of the background to the suffering images, 
well-understood causes for the fighting between the groups involved, and ultimately 
an explicable political process. At no point was this simply an impossible story of 
“warring tribes.”  On the other hand the shorthand and frequently lazy formulation of 
“ethnic conflict” is used all too often in African crises (Allen & Seaton, 1999) from 
Darfur to Rwanda to Kenya. The contrast between the explanation of the Bosnian and 
Rwandan crises makes clear how the reporting differs and how this in turn gives a 
very different frame (Myers, 1996). 
 
“Pure Humanitarianism” 
 
The problem with these cases is that media’s acceptance and promotion of simplistic 
narratives of humanitarian crisis, devoid of complexities and context, has historically 
led to unintended consequences. As Andersen (2006) has argued in the case of the 
Civil War in El Salvador, lack of political context when reporting conflict has 
historically led to the trope of hopelessness in news coverage. When media mystify 
the causes of conflict and viewers are offered no understanding and therefore no 
pathways for action, human suffering becomes as hopeless as it is inevitable. 
Hopelessness without political context has been characterized by the filmmaker Adam 
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Curtis as the phenomenon of “O Dearism” (Curtis, 2009). He describes this “pure” 
decontextualized version of humanitarian  events, where the focus is on faraway 
victims and inexplicable suffering, as a disconnected exclamation of “O Dear,” an 
attitude of helplessness and inability to deal with the problem. His film makes a plea 
to reinsert the political understanding necessary to engage with so many apparently 
“humanitarian” crises.  Curtis links the end of the Cold War as the origins of O 
Dearism because of the disappearance of an overarching framework of ideology, but 
in fact the disconnected framing of humanitarian suffering had begun well before this 
point and was evident already in the coverage of the crisis in Biafra.  
So who is at fault for the omission of politics and for the problem of the “pure 
humanitarian” interpretations? There are at least three substantial and interconnected 
sets of causes we can identify. Firstly, news reporting allows the political dimension 
to be left out. In particular, the reliance upon images and the unwillingness to explain 
the complexities and confront the stereotypes have far reaching consequences. 
 
Secondly, there is the complex role of the NGOs, many of which are now global 
multi- million dollar brands. As a consequence, what are now relatively powerful 
institutions may seek a consciously apolitical position in many of these situations,  
which is particularly significant given their increasingly direct use of media to report 
events in the field. (Cooper, 2011) As Nieman (2009) agues, many NGOs are seeking 
to preserve a role for themselves and their own brand using effective Public Relations, 
and media are influenced by these strategies. The uncomfortable reality may therefore 
not be acknowledged that on occasion it could be better not to intervene or even to 
withdraw because humanitarian aid might not be achieving its goals (Howard, 2010). 
In addition, these complications make it increasingly difficult to determine when and 
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if relief agencies and international NGOs are the best actors to take on the burden of 
humanitarian relief. In some cases, shouldering a burden that may be better 
shouldered locally may absolve those intent on fighting of responsibility (Holmes, 
2013). This is a version of what is sometimes referred to as “fungibility” where 
support from aid agencies allows recipient governments to shift resources around and 
pursue other agendas, even that extends conflict?  (Sobhee and Nath, 2010).  Indeed, 
Linda Polman (2010, 2011) in her critiques of the aid world cites many examples 
where humanitarian intervention led to worsening outcomes.   
 
 This links to the third set of causes for the absence of politics, which derives from the 
intentions of those who are participants. There are many reasons why certain actors 
involved in a crisis, both directly as protagonists or indirectly for example as donor 
nations, would favor a limited interpretation of humanitarian crisis, preferring 
wherever possible that disasters remain “natural.” At a global level, many in the 
international community might wish to preserve the status quo. In many cases where 
aid is required the recipients, even in “normal times,” are living very close to the edge 
of extreme poverty and potential hunger. Addressing the overall causes for such huge 
disparities would itself be viewed as destabilizing and a challenge to the hegemony 
that governs the international distribution of power (Chouliaraki L. , 2012). Not 
engaging with the complex inequities and balances of global power is a result of 
avoiding a discussion of deep structural economic inequalities that characterize the 
global North and South Meanwhile participants on the ground, in particular 
competing violent groups, may have their own agendas. Linda Polman’s argument is 
that many want aid as a tool for their own ends and to exploit as a potential powerful 
commodity, rather than a resource for helping needy civilians (Polman, 2011). In 
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other crises, protagonists above all favor a lack of interference, insisting that the 
international community should just provide the aid and keep themselves at arms 
length. Such is the case that has played out for some years in Somalia for example 
with the resistance by groups like Al Shabab to NGO relief work (Holmes, 2013). 
 
John Holmes was the UN under-secretary general for humanitarian affairs and in this 
capacity between 2007 and 2010 dealt with a range of devastating crises ranging from 
Darfur to Haiti (Holmes, 2013). In the account of this period “The Politics of 
Humanity” Holmes, became convinced of the overwhelming need to understand the 
nuance and complexity of the political dimensions of these problems, arguing that 
“media coverage is not interested in nuance and the experts are not listened to because 
what they say is not black and white enough to conform to our prejudices.” It is 
apparent from so many of the crises he describes, such as the Democratic Republic of 
Congo or the Sri Lankan Tamils, that instead of simple dichotomies between good 
and evil, or black and white, only multiple juxtaposed shades of grey actually exist. 
And the civil war in Syria has provided a further example of this with multiple 
warring groups where outsiders find it almost impossible to decipher and understand 
who is worthy of support.  
 
Situations like this do not provide a ready narrative either for media or the public 
because they are too complex and indecipherable. As a consequence, once again the 
focus becomes the overwhelming scale of humanitarian suffering, a frame 
disconnected from the complicated political causation  (Calhoun, 2016). In this way 
even a crisis like the Haitian earthquake in 2010, which by all appearances is purely a 
“natural” disaster, also has a profound political dimension. The ongoing chaos of  
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relief efforts in Haiti and the failure after years to satisfactorily rebuild despite the 
huge scale of aid and involvement of thousands of NGOs, indicates the profound 
political background to such a crisis (Katz, 2014).  
 
 Understanding Africa 
This history of media coverage of Africa has left its mark on the global perception of 
the continent, and that in turn has deeply affected the ways in which humanitarian 
crises have been understood, narrated and responded to.  The absence of a political 
understanding of the often messy political realities in continuing African crises has 
led to a particular dilemma. For some years there has been a debate about the 
persistent negative reporting of Africa (Hawk, 1992, Wainaina, 2005)  (Bunce, Franks 
and Paterson, 2016). The term “Afro-Pessimism” conveys the lack of positive news in 
the way that Africa is depicted in the international news media, with the continual 
emphasis upon unpleasant suffering rather than the more balanced news frames that 
are used in reporting other areas of the world. This has led on to a determined effort to 
try and highlight  “good news stories” in the reporting of Africa (Gault, 2007) to try 
and counter Afro-Pessimism. But the origins of this negative framing in the coverage 
can also be traced back to the same absence of political understanding. (Pawson, 
2007) Since those original powerful images use in the Biafran crisis a key 
characteristic of reporting from Africa was a disconnected story without a context of 
politics and the ability to politically solve anything. As a result, the reporting became 
a parade of misery, a succession of wars, famines and disasters - punctuated by the 
occasional celebrity story of someone famous coming to “help.” 
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If the frame of the story is terrible suffering, conveyed by such images with little 
means to engage with how the crisis could be understood and potentially solved, then 
there is inevitably a degree of hopelessness, which has thus been characterized as 
“Afro-pessimism.” In many ways this is a direct legacy of the power of images to 
override a complex and difficult to interpret narrative. The saying goes that “ a picture 
is worth a thousand words” but equally so there are many cases where a picture can 
obscure and distort the words that a journalist might be seeking to convey. (Luyendijk, 
2010) And in the new media and social media environment there are even more ways 
in which pictures can be misleading. (Cooper, 2011) (Cottle and Cooper, 2015) 
 
David Clark has written in particular about the production of the contemporary 
famine image (Clark, 2004) and the immense (global) resonance that surrounds these 
pictures as a recent phenomenon. But as we have seen, it was the Ethiopian famine, 
(and the Biafran conflict beforehand) that established the trope of the images of 
distant suffering. In addition, such imaging corresponded to the significant rise in 
NGOs, which were experiencing a powerful impact from these new forms of global 
communication. “1984/5 was a crucial moment in the trajectory of NGOs. It brought 
their work prominence and assured them greater prestige and a much larger income 
than they had experienced previously. These benefits were achieved by virtue of a 
hyper-inflation in images of Africa” (Lidichi, 1993, p. 107).  Such image tropes are 
shocking and powerful, but they also result in a paradox. If their simplistic “pure 
humanitarian frame,” which reduces the trope to the simple suffering victims, 
obscures an awkward and complicated message of political realities, where for 
example multiple unpleasant protagonists vie for control, and in turn are offered aid, 
that may in turn result in worse harm.  
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Rethinking African Images 
The images surrounding the coverage of the Ethiopian famine were able to yield such 
extraordinary reactions that it prompted some thinking by a group of aid agencies 
about the potency and power of such pictures. In particular it led to soul searching 
about the ways that Africa was being depicted through a kind of biblical suffering this 
visual style portrays (van der Gaag & Nash, 1987).This deliberation led eventually to 
agreements and codes of conduct by NGOs on the use of images, starting with Article 
10 of the Red Cross Code in 1992. Yet many years later it is still apparent that many 
of the images used regularly by some (but not all) NGOs in their marketing and fund 
raising are far from being “responsible.” The agendas of many NGOs is to highlight 
suffering and achieve donations and this “commodification of suffering” remains the 
most effective way to achieve those goals, even if it reduces the message to an 
oversimplified and distorted one. (Aid Thoughts, 2009) 
 
The way that NGOs portray themselves and relate to crises has received some 
attention in the recent literature (Kalcsics, 2011). At the most basic level they want 
simplicity, a message that will enhance and not impede fund raising. A humanitarian 
crisis, caused by a complex emergency where multiple unpleasant warring factions 
are in a protracted conflict, is not a good message to distil to the charity-giving public 
(Smillie & Minear, 2004). The ongoing conflict in the Congo, which since the mid 
1990s has seen more loss of life than any other war since 1945, is a prime example of 
all these difficulties. Referred to as “Africa’s hidden world war” (Benn, 2004) it has 
remained relatively unreported, and therefore notoriously difficult from a fundraising 
perspective. There have been specific aspects of the conflict, in particular the repeated 
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incidents of mass rape, which have managed to highlight sporadic attention, but those 
stories have been rather disconnected from the broader political context and the 
inevitable negotiating process that would be the only way to curtail this situation for 
good (Holmes, 2013, pp. 148-155). There are plenty of stories and fundraising for 
rape crisis centers and medical assistance but as Holmes argues there is insufficient 
wider political will to engage with the underlying causes of the suffering.  
 
Urs Boegli a former head of the ICRC media services made the observation  
“Far too many disasters with political causes and for which there can only be political 
solutions are today labelled “humanitarian crises”… After all, rape is rape...no one 
would describe it as a “gynaecological disaster.” Yet conflicts, which are referred to 
as “humanitarian disasters,” are often much more than that. This steers the 
international response in the wrong direction, towards purely humanitarian action in 
cases where political action is required” (Boegli, 1998). 
 
Boegli and many others are seeking to find ways to explain and interpret that does not 
present a distinct “pure humanitarian” story set apart from other analysis and concerns. 
In this way we should look for a unified narrative, which reflects the far more 
nuanced way that we report from within our own societies, rather than using the frame 
of a humanitarian narrative, which is about the hopeless, inevitable suffering of a 
distant “other,” reporting devoid of political nuance, explanation and public 
understanding.  
  
The message that many aid professionals have unthinkingly used and that media have 
promoted is that “A starving child knows no politics”  (BBC, 2000). The assumption 
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is that it should be a straightforward matter of providing help for such a (blameless) 
victim and that there is somehow a neutral zone where that is achievable, without 
having to engage with complex surrounding political realities. In this scenario, the 
role of the relief worker is simple; cut through the middle, provide the aid and 
unquestioningly, save lives. Yet in the context of many complex emergencies this 
now appears to be naïve, simplistic, and ultimately counterproductive. As Alex de 
Waal has argued “ A hungry child is created by politics” (de Waal, 1997). To end the 
cycle of on-going humanitarian crisis, it is imperative that relief agencies, recipients, 
governments and the media all acknowledge and engage the complex political and 
social realities that increasingly define the context of disaster. Only then will donors, 
agencies, governments and publics be able understand disasters and respond in ways 
befitting a global humanitarian community.  
 
 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY  
 
Aid Thoughts (2009) Available at: http://aidthoughts.org/?p=69 (accessed 13/3/2016) 
 
Alagiah, G. (2001). A Passage to Africa. London: Little Brown. 
 
Allen, T., & Seaton, a. J. (1999). The Media of Conflict. London: Zed Books. 
 
Article 19. (1990). Starving in Silence.  
 
Barrow, O., & Jenkins, M. (2001). The Charitable Response. NGOs and development 
in East and North East Africa. Oxford: James Currey. 
 
BBC. (1995). Nigerian War Against Biafra 1967-1970. Retrieved July 22, 2013 
from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J3ReFoFp0Gs. 
20 
 
 
Benn, H. (2004, 11 24). BBC-World Service Trust/DFID conference “The Media and 
Development; Communication and the Millennium Development Goals.”. Retrieved 
09 20, 2014 from 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dfid.gov.uk/news/fil
es/speeches/bennmedia24nov04.asp 
 
Benthall, J. (2010). Disasters, Relief and the Media. London: Sean Kingston. 
 
Bertschinger, C. (2005). Moving Mountains . London: Doubleday. 
 
Boegli, U. (1998). A Few thoughts on the relationship between humanitarian 
agencies and the media. Dispatches from Disaster Zones. 
www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng/html/57JPJG. (Accessed 20/3/2016) 
 
Boltanski, L. (1999). Distant Suffering. Cambridge: CUP. 
 
Brauman, R. (1988). “Refugee Camps, Population Transfers and NGOs”. In J. 
Moore, Hard Choices: Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention. Maryland: 
Rowman and Littlefield. 
 
Buerk, M. (2004). The Road Taken. London: Hutchinson . 
Bunce, M., Franks, S. and  Paterson, C. (eds.) (2016)  Africa”s Media Image in the 
Twenty First Century. From "Heart of Darkness" to "Africa 
Rising".  London:  Routledge. 
Calhoun, C. (2016) “Keynote speech: Everyday Humanitarianism. Ethics, Affects and 
Practices at London School of Economics.” 14/4/2016.  
 
Chouliaraki, L. (2012). The Ironic Spectator. Solidarity in an age of post-
humanitarianism. London: Polity. 
 
Chouliaraki, L. (2006). The Spectatorship of Suffering . London: Sage.   
 
Clark, D. (2004). The Production of a Contemporary Famine Image. Journal of 
International Development , 693-704. 
 
Clay, J. (1989). Ethiopian Famine and the Relief Agencies. In B. Nicols, & a. G. 
Loescher, The Moral National: Humanitarianism and US Foreign Pokicy Today . 
Notre Dame : University of Notre Dame Press . 
 
Clay, J., & Holcomb, B. (1986). Politics and the Ethiopian Famine. Cambridge MA: 
Cultural Survival Inc. 
 
Cooper, G. (2011). From their own Correspondent.New Media and the Changes in 
Disaster Coverage. Lessons to be Learnt. Oxford: Reuters Institute for the Study of 
Journalism . 
21 
 
Cottle, S., and Cooper, G. (2015) Humanitarianism, communications and 
change.  New York:  Peter Lang. 
Curtis, A. (2009). O Dearism . Retrieved July 23, 2013 from 
http://archive.org/details/AdamCurtis-OhDearism. 
 
de Waal, A. (1997). Famine Crimes. Oxford: James Currey. 
 
Dowden, R. (2004). “War Reporting in Africa” Private seminar at St Anthony”s 
College, Oxford. 04/11/04. . 
 
Franks, S. (2013). Reporting Disaster. Famine, Aid, Politics and the Media. London: 
Hurst. 
 
Gault, C. H. (2007). New News out of Africa. London: Yale University Press. 
 
Giorgis, D. W. (1989). Red Tears War, Famine and Revolution in Ethiopia. New 
Jersey: Red Sea Press. 
 
Harrison, P., & Palmer, R. (1986). News out of Africa. From Biafra to Band Aid. 
London: Hilary Shipman. 
 
Hawk, B. G. (1992). Africa”s Media Image. New York: Prager. 
 
Hawkins, V. (2008). Stealth Conflicts. How the World”s Worst Violence is ignored. 
Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate. 
 
Holmes, J. (2013). The Politics of Humanity. The Reality of Relief Aid. London: 
Head of Zeus. 
Howard, R. (2010) No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: Complications of U.S. 
Humanitarian Aid.  ProQuest Dissertations Publishing.  
Humanitarian Practice Network. (2002, March). Silent Crises. Humanitarian 
Exchange . 
 
Invisible Children. (2012). http://invisiblechildren.com/kony/. Retrieved July 25, 
2013 
 
Kalcsics, M. (2011). A Reporting disaster? The interdependence of media and aid 
agencies in a competitive compoassion market. Oxford : Reuters Insitute 
Fellowship Paper . 
 
Katz, J. (2013) The Big Truck That Went By: How the World Came to Save Haiti 
and Left Behind a Disaster. New York: Palgrave. 
 
Lidichi, H. (1993). All in the Choosing Eye: Charity, Representation and the 
Developing World . (Open University: Unpublished PhD thesis,). 
 
22 
 
Luyendijk, J. (2010). Hello Everybody. One Journalist”s Search for Truth in the 
Middle East. London: Profile Books. 
 
Morozov, E. (2005). The Net Delusion. How not to liberate the world. . London: 
Penguin. 
 
Myers, G. T. (1996). The Inscription of Difference: News Coverage of the Conflicts 
in Rwanda and Bosnia. Political Geography , 15 (1) pp21-46. 
 
Nieman. (2009). http://www.niemanlab.org/ngo/.(Accessed 12/05/2016) 
 
Pawson, L. (2007). Reporting Africa”s Unknown Wars. In S. Maltby, & R. Keeble, 
Communicating War: Memory, Media and Military. Arima. 
Polman, L. (2010) The crisis caravan: what”s wrong with humanitarian aid?  New 
York:  Picador. 
Polman, L. (2011). War Games: The Story of Aid and War in Modern Times. 
London: Viking . 
 
Rieff, D. (2002). A Bed for the Night. Humanitarianism in Crisis. London: Vintage. 
 
Robinson, P. (2002). The CNN Effect: : The myth of news, foreign policy and 
intervention . London: Routledge. 
 
Save the Children. (2011). http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lTyuJEyXquU. 
Retrieved July 24, 2013 
 
Sen, Arijit. (2011). Marginal on the Map: Hidden Wars and HIdden Media. 
Conflict in India”s Northeastern states, the response of the State, how it affects 
people and how it is reported in the media. Media in Conflict and Peacebuilding. 
Oxford Peace Conference. 
 
Sen, Amartya. (1981). Poverty and Famines. An Essay on Entitlement. OUP. 
 
Smillie, I. (1995). The Alms Bazaar. London: ITP. 
 
Smillie, I., & Minear, L. (2004). The Charity of Nations Humanitarian Action in a 
Calculating World . Bloomfield CT: Kumarian Press. 
Sobhee, S.K. and Nath, S. (2010)  ”Is Donors” Concern about the Fungibility of 
Foreign Aid Justified?: A Panel Data Analysis”, The Journal of Developing Areas, 43 
(2), pp.299-311. 
Terry, F. (2002). Condemned to Repeat. The Paradox of Humanitarian Action. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Tourists of the Revolution - Interview with Michael Priestly, former head of UN 
Special Office in Ethiopia (2000) Directed by BBC. [DVD] or [Blue-ray] . 
23 
 
van der Gaag, N., & Nash, C. (1987). Images of Africa: The UK Report. . Oxfam. 
Wainaina, B. (2005, Winter). How to Write about Africa. Granta 92 . 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Professor Suzanne Franks is Head of the Journalism Department at City University 
London. She is a former BBC TV journalist and has written widely on the history of 
broadcasting, the coverage of international news and humanitarian communication. 
Her recent publications include Reporting Disasters. Famine, Aid, Politics and the 
Media (Hurst, 2013) and the co-edited volume Africa’s Media Image in the Twenty-
first Century (Routledge, 2016).    
 
 
 
